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Abstract 
  
In this paper we evaluate the current account patterns of China and Germany.  We 
point out that China's current account surplus as a share of global GDP in recent years 
resembles that of Germany’s.  Yet, an important difference is that the Euro block’s 
current account inclusive of Germany, has overall been balanced, whereas emerging 
Asia's current account inclusive of China, has mostly been characterized by sizable 
surpluses.  We further find that both China and Germany's current account surpluses 
seem to be accounted for by common factors.  However we have reasons to doubt the 
long run viability of these current account trends in future decades. Demographic 
transitions in China and Germany are projected to reduce their surpluses, and this 
effect is stronger for Germany. We also discuss plausible reasons to doubt the extent 
to which the Euro block will move towards significant surplus in the coming years. 
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 “Let me introduce you to Chermany, a composite of the world’s biggest net exporters: China, with a forecast 
current account surplus of $291bn this year and Germany, with a forecast surplus of $187bn.  … Both also believe 
that their customers should keep buying, but stop irresponsible borrowing. Since their surpluses entail others’ 
deficits, this position is incoherent. Surplus countries have to finance those in deficit. If the stock of debt becomes 
too big, the debtors will default. If so, the vaunted “savings” of surplus countries will prove to have been illusory: 
vendor finance becomes, after the fact, open export subsidies.” 
Martin Wolf, “China and Germany Unite to Impose Global Deflation” Financial Times, March 16, 10 
  
 The great recession has focused attention on the sizable current account surpluses 
of China and Germany, leading some observers to align the two into a unified block 
sharing similar agenda.  The purpose of our note is to evaluate the current account 
patterns of China and Germany in context of the global imbalances, and to discuss the 
future prospects of the continuation of these surpluses.  We start by reviewing the current 
account patterns of these two countries during the last 30 years. Thereafter, we evaluate 
their current account patterns in context of regional and global imbalances, then conduct 
an empirical analysis of the possibility that common global and domestic factors account 
for the current account patterns of both countries, and finally conclude with an 
assessment of future trends.   
 From a quick inspection of the data, China seems to be the new Germany rather 
than the other way round. Indeed, Germany has been running significant current account 
surpluses during most of the 1980s, reaching 5% of its GDP in the mid 1980s, at a time 
when China experienced current account deficits, reaching -4 % of its GDP in the mid 
1980s [see Figure 1].  Germany’s current account moved towards a balanced position 
during the 1990s, possibly reflecting the fiscal challenges associated with unification with 
East Germany. On the other hand China’s current account stance changed from closed to 
being balanced in the first half of the 1990s, into surpluses ranging between 2% and 4% 
of its GDP during the second half of the 1990s.  Intriguingly, in the 2000s, the patterns of 
the current accounts of China and Germany became highly correlated, moving in tandem, 
from about 2% to nearly 10% of their respective GDPs in 2006, and dropping to 6% of 
their GDPs in 2008.  Figure 3 suggests that an obvious common external factor was 
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‘accounting’ for the current account patterns of Chermany: the US current account 
deficit. 1 
 Figure 1, focusing on the current account to GDP ratio, overlooks the fact that 
size matters. Small countries play a minor role in global imbalances, independent of their 
current account to GDP ratios [see Aizenman and Sun (2010)].  The big story of the last 
30 years has been the sustainable, high growth rate of Chinese economy. From a small 
economy close to autarky in 1980, China has now become a major trader of goods and 
services, and a key player in the context of global imbalances.  This is vividly illustrated 
by tracing the current account patterns of China and Germany in USD Billions, in Figure 
2.  It is worthwhile to note here that unitl 1994, the contribution of China to global 
imbalances was pratically nil.  China’s current account surplus accelerated from 2000s 
onwards, surpassing that of Gemany in 2007, thereby confirming the point that, if at all, 
China is the new Germany. The remakable accleration of current account srupluses of 
China took place at a time when trade openness of China, which was about one-third of 
Germany in the early 1980s, reached that of Germany in 2000s [see Figures 6-7].2 
 A look at the regional patterns reveals an obvious difference between Germany 
and China.  Germany has been the anchor of exchange rate of the core of Europe before 
and after the formation of the Euro.  Figure 3 shows that during the last 30 years the 
average current account of the Euro block was close to a balanced position.  Thus, as long 
as the Euro block is viable, and its current account is closed to being balanced, concerns 
about the German current account surpluses happen to be more of an European issue, 
rather than a Global-imbalances issue.  In contrast, China has been de-facto part of the 
dollar block- a block that seems to be characterized during the 2000s by sizable current 
account surpluses of China, moving in tandem (but in opposite direction) with the current                                                         
1 Over the last decade (2000 to 2009) the correlation coefficients between US current account and the 
current accounts of China and Germany were, -0.42 and -0.81 respectively.  
2 The correlation coefficients between the current accounts (in USD) of China and Germany between 1980-
1994 and 1995-2009 were, -0.29 and 0.93 respectively.  Furthermore, the correlation coefficients between 
current accounts (in USD) of China and USA between 1980-1994 and 1995-2009 were, 0.48 and -0.61 
respectively. The correlation coefficients between current accounts (in USD) of Germany and USA 
between 1980-1994 and 1995-2009 were, -0.57 and -0.81 respectively.  
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account of the US.   These patterns were dubbed by Dooley et al (2003) as Bretton 
Woods II. However, it is fair to say that Europe has been quite a neutral block in terms of 
its net contribution to global imbalances, and most of the balancing of the current account 
deficits of the US during the 2000s was done by East Asia and the oil and commodity 
exporting countries.  Ironically, Germany seems to play the role of China within the Euro 
block, de-facto financing deficits of other block members [See Figures 4 and 5].   
 
Data Analysis 
Against this background, we next evaluate the patterns of the current account to 
GDP ratios of China and Germany, as a function of lagged conditional variables in a 
panel analysis, for 1970-2009 [see Tables 1-2].  The relatively short duration of our 
sample constrains our approach, and hence we sequentially add lagged conditioning 
variables to a bivariate regression.  The set of controlling variables is mostly from Chinn 
and Prasad (2003) and Gruber and Kamin (2007).  It includes the US current account 
(reflecting the possible impact of the US as the demander of last resort), world growth 
rate, a country’s net foreign asset position, government budget balance, demographic 
factors (old and young dependency ratios), domestic credit to GDP ratio to proxy for 
domestic financial depth, trade openness, and a country’s own GDP growth rate. We also 
estimate these countries’ current account patterns by applying the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression [SUR] Model, for 1970-2009 [see Table 3].    
One result that is common to all our estimations is the key importance of a 
common global factor -- the US current account.  In the SUR model, the current 
account/GDP surpluses of China and Germany are found to be moving in tandem with 
the US current account/GDP deficits, with a coefficient that is close to one. This implies 
that a rise in US current account/GDP deficit by 1% is associated with an equal rise of the 
current account/GDP surpluses of China and Germany.  The growth rate of the global 
GDP seems to be playing an important role for Germany, but not for China.  These 
results are in line with the key role of the US as the demander of last resort during our 
sample period.   
  4 
 
Future Trends: Discussion  
 The dominance of the US as the spender or demander of last resort before the 
crisis, and the importance of the global growth rate in accounting for the surpluses of 
Germany hints at the limited viability of large future current account surpluses of China 
and Germany.  This may especially be the case if the drop in US current account 
deficit/GDP ratio endures beyond the crisis period.  In the global equilibrium, the sum of 
all current accounts should add up (up to statistical discrepancy) to zero.  Hence, focusing 
on the creditors as the source of the challenges facing the global economy overlooks the 
contribution of the US itself to global imbalances.   Similarly, focusing only on the 
debtor(s) would overlook the need for all parties to move from the pre-crisis state of 
affairs to the post-crisis one.   
 There are reasons to expect that the pre-crisis trends may be unsustainable.  To 
recall, in 2000-2007, the US current account deficit/GDP was about 4-5%, funded 
partially by Chinese surpluses of about 8-10%, and significant current account surpluses 
of oil exporters, and few other countries.  Looking forward, demographic factors are 
likely to impose important balancing effects on future current account trends.  Figure 9 
suggests that future demographic transitions would work towards narrowing the surpluses 
on China and Germany.  During the next 30 years, the dependency rate of the old 
(population share of 65 years and older) in Germany and China would increase 
dramatically relative to the US.  The dependency ratio of the old in the German and 
Chinese population is projected to increase during 2010-2035 by about 24% and 19%, 
respectively, whereas that of the US would increase by 14%.   The dependency ratio of 
the young (population share of 15 years and younger) in Germany is projected to increase 
by 2%, whereas that of the US and China are predicted to go down by 4% and 2%, 
respectively.   These trends may work towards mitigating the surpluses of China and 
Germany.  Table 4 summarizes the projected changes in the dependency rates, and their 
projected marginal contributions, applying the regression results of Gruber and Kamin 
(2007).  The demographic transitions of China and Germany in the next 25 years are 
projected to reduce their current account/GDP by about 2.5% and 3.5%, respectively.  
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This effect is stronger for Germany, reflecting the greater increase in the old dependency 
rate in Germany.   These adjustments tend to be front-loaded, as the old dependency ratio 
curves in Figure 9 follow logistic patterns, and hence this process is likely to kick-in early 
on.  The demographic transition in the US is projected in increase US current account 
deficit/GDP by 2%.  Consequently, the projected demographic transitions in China and 
Germany would reduce their current account surpluses, mitigating their contribution to 
global imbalances.  In contrast, the projected demographic transition in the US would 
increase US current account deficit, suggesting that demographics would not mitigate the 
need of the US to increase its net savings.  
 While projecting future GDP growth rates may be subject to larger standard errors 
than projecting demographic trends, most observers expect the growth rates of China and 
other emerging markets to exceed that of the US and the OECD countries by a large 
margin.  This trend has important repercussions on the future global imbalances, and the 
current accounts of China and Germany.  A small country embarking on an export led 
growth, like China in the 1970s, can sustain it without imposing negative ripple effects as 
long as its relative size remains small. However, the long run success of the Chinese 
growth strategy may put in motion forces that may curtail the sustainability of a high 
GDP growth rate and a large current account surplus path. By now, China has reached a 
critical mass of “an elephant running in a China store.” The continuation of the fast 
growth rate of China, while maintaining large current account surplus/GDP , would be 
conditional on the sustainability of larger current account deficit/GDP of countries that 
grow at a much slower rate. This can be illustrated by investigating the size distribution 
and the durability of current account deficits, and by a simulation that relies on the 
adding-up property of current account balances, which, up to statistical discrepancies, 
should sum-up to zero.  
 
Aizenman and Sun (2010) found that, with the exception of the US, the duration 
of spells of current account deficits during the decades prior to the 2008-09 global crisis 
depended negatively on the relative size of a country, as measured by its GDP/World 
GDP.  The continuation of the pre-crisis path of the Chinese GDP growth rate, exceeding 
10% a year while sustaining a current account/GDP ratio of 10 % would require 
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overtime, large increases in the current account/GDP ratios of large players, like the US.  
Short of the emergence of a new demander of last resort, one may reasonably expect the 
unwinding of global imbalances in the coming years. This follows the observation that 
the US is already facing deleveraging “stabilization blues.”  The housing market 
weaknesses and the resultant private sector deleveraging point to probable reduction of 
consumption and increase in saving, thereby curtailing US current account deficits [see 
Glick and Lansing (2009)]. Similarly, the Greek crisis has put in motion forces 
reinforcing belt-tightening in Southern Europe. Coupled with this, the differential attitude 
towards fiscal policy of the core of Europe, i.e. of France and Germany, suggests that 
Europe may not be eager to replace the old role of the US as the global demander of last 
resort.  EU’s tendency to run on average, balanced current accounts remains an issue that 
deserves further exploration.  Arguably, this may reflect the greater political bargaining 
clout of labor in Europe relative to the US.   In circumstances when current account 
deficits are driven by balance of trade deficits, labor may oppose larger deficits to 
mitigate downwards wage pressure.    
 
The unwinding of global imbalances may be facilitated by a gradual shift of 
China from export led growth, towards a balanced growth of internal demand, a strategy 
that may be consistent with the continuation of Chinese employment and GDP growth 
[see Feenstra and Hong (2010)].  In addition to this, the continued rise in global GDP 
share of emerging markets may provide a further impetus for Asian countries to switch 
towards heavier reliance on policies boosting domestic demand. This in turn suggests the 
presence of market forces that may induce China and other emerging markets to scale 
down their current account surpluses over time. Thus, we may expect that short of the 
emergence of a “new demander of last resort” replacing the US, the Chinese growth path 
would be challenged by the limited appetite for prolonged current account deficits of 
most countries, and Europe would continue running close to balanced current accounts.  
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Figure 1: Current Account to GDP Ratios of China and Germany  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Current Account Balance in USD Billions of China and Germany  
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Figure 3: Countries’ Current Account Balance as percentage of World GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: China’s Exports to three main regions as percentage of its exports to East 
Asia3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         3 East Asia here includes the ASEAN countries as well as Hong Kong (HK), Japan (JA), Korea (KO) and 
India (IND). 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Figure 5: Germany’s Exports to three main regions as percentage of its exports to 
EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Ratio of Exports to GDP of China and Germany 
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Figure 7: Ratio of Imports to GDP of China and Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Projections of Dependency Ratios (Young) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  12 
Figure 9: Projections of Dependency Ratios (Old)  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Table 1: Estimation of Germany's Current Account/GDP  
Notes: The dependent variable is current Notes: The dependent variable is current account balance scaled 
by GDP of Germany. The     table shows time-series estimation results from ordinary least squares 
regression over the period from 1970 to 2009, using lagged, annual values of all explanatory variables. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lagged Net 
Foreign 
Assets/GDP 0.11*** 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.11** 0.02 -0.00 0.04 -0.02 
  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
Lagged US 
Current 
Account/GDP  -0.67*** -0.68*** -0.88*** -0.67*** -1.61*** -0.57*** -0.67*** -0.43*** 
   -0.20 -0.19 -0.28 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.15 
Lagged World 
Growth Rate  0.10** 0.11** 0.08 0.10** -0.03 0.11** 0.11** 0.02 
   -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
Lagged Govt. 
Budget 
Balance/GDP   -0.06        
    -0.19        
Lagged 
Dependency 
Ratio (Young)    0.11       
     -0.08       
Lagged 
Dependency 
Ratio (Old)     -0.46*      
      -0.24      
Lagged Domestic 
Credit/GDP      -0.09***     
       -0.01     
Lagged Trade 
Openness       0.11*    
        -0.06    
Lagged GDP 
Growth Rate        -0.06   
         -0.17   
Lagged Current 
Account/GDP         0.73*** 
          -0.14 
Constant -0.42 -1.46*** -1.61** -4.37* 8.45 7.28*** -5.90** -1.34** -0.21 
  -0.50 -0.49 -0.77 -2.16 -5.12 -1.42 -2.41 -0.59 -0.47 
Observations 39 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R-squared 0.44 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.80 0.62 0.59 0.77 
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   Table 2: Estimation of China's Current Account/GDP4 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lagged US 
Current 
Account/GDP -1.01*** 0.41         
  -0.25 -0.34         
Lagged World 
Growth Rate 0.04 0.06         
  -0.07 -0.04         
Lagged Net 
Foreign 
Assets/GDP  0.22*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 
   -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 
Lagged Govt. 
Budget 
Balance/GDP   0.23        
    -0.20        
Lagged 
Dependency 
Ratio (Young)    -0.39       
     -0.80       
Lagged 
Dependency 
Ratio (Old)     0.08      
      -0.05      
Lagged 
Domestic 
Credit/GDP      -0.01     
       -0.02     
Lagged Trade 
Openness       0.04    
        -0.06    
Lagged GDP 
Growth Rate        -0.32***   
         -0.10   
Lagged Current 
Account/GDP         0.42*** 
          -0.15 
Constant -0.39 -0.62 -0.15 2.47 -5.10* 0.32 -1.64 2.39** -0.30 
  -0.80 -0.70 -0.68 -6.50 -2.95 -1.13 -1.41 -0.91 -0.44 
Observations 38 32 32 32 32 32 29 32 32 
R-squared 0.38 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.80 0.77 
 Notes: The dependent variable is current account balance scaled by GDP of China. The table shows time-
series estimation results from ordinary least squares regression over the period from 1970 to 2009, using 
lagged, annual values of all explanatory variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
                                                        
4 Given the relatively high correlation between China’s NFA and US current account deficit (-0.8), we 
exclude US current account as well as world growth rate from column (3) onwards i.e. when China’s 
lagged NFA to GDP ratio is incorporated.  
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Table 3: Impact of Common Factors on Current Account/GDP  
VARIABLES Current Account/GDP of 
China (in %) 
Current Account/GDP of 
Germany (in %) 
Lagged US Current 
Account/GDP 
-0.96*** 
(0.21) 
-0.96** 
(0.14) 
Lagged Own Growth Rate 0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Lagged World Growth Rate 0.01 
(0.07) 
0.20*** 
(0.08) 
Constant -0.60 
(0.83) 
-1.64*** 
(0.59) 
Observations 38 38 
R-Squared 0.41 0.60 
Notes: The dependent variable is current account balance scaled by GDP of China and Germany 
respectively. The table shows time-series estimation results from a seemingly unrelated regression model 
over the period from 1970 to 2009, using lagged, annual values of all explanatory variables.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Table 4: Predicted Impact of Demographic Changes on Current Account/GDP 
between 2010 and 2035 
Countries 
Projected 
Change in 
Dependency 
Ratio 
(Young) 
Predicted 
marginal impact 
on the Current 
Account/GDP 
Projected  
Change in 
Dependency 
Ratio (Old) 
Predicted 
marginal impact 
on the Current 
Account/GDP 
Predicted 
total marginal 
impact on the 
Current 
Account/GDP 
      
China -0.04 0.001 0.19 -0.026 -0.024 
      
Germany 0.02 -0.001 0.24 -0.032 -0.033 
      
USA -0.02 0.001 0.14 -0.019 -0.018 
Notes:  The projected changes in dependency ratios (young and old) are from the United Nations World 
Population Database. The predicted marginal impact on the current account/GDP for each country is based 
on Gruber and Kamin (2007), regression (1) in Table 2.  They found that the marginal effects of young and 
old dependency ratios are -0.03 and -0.13, respectively.  To illustrate, an increase of the old dependency 
ratio by 0.24 is projected to change the current account by -0.13*0.24 = - 0.032, reducing surpluses (or 
increasing deficit) by about 3% of the GDP.    
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Appendix: Data Description 
Variables Data Sources 
Current Account, Nominal GDP, Net Foreign Assets, 
Government Budget Balance 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
Age Dependency Ratio, Young (% of working-age population 
below 15 years) 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
Age Dependency Ratio, Old (% of working-age population above 
65 years) 
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
Trade Openness (Sum of Exports and Imports Divided by GDP) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT) 
Projections of Dependency Ratios (Young and Old) United Nations World Population 
Database 
  
